Microsoft 365 token replay: investigate devices, MFA and inbox rules together
27 October 2026
Suspect Microsoft 365 token replay? Check device registrations, MFA changes and hidden inbox rules together before restoring trust in an account.
Huntress has reported a ten-week campaign against Microsoft 365 accounts involving adversary-in-the-middle phishing, stolen-token reuse, unauthorised device registrations, changes to multifactor authentication and concealed inbox rules. For Australian businesses, Microsoft 365 token replay is a reminder that recovering a mailbox requires more than resetting its password.
The practical lesson is to investigate identity access and email behaviour together. A suspicious sign-in, a newly registered device and a rule hiding supplier emails may be parts of the same incident, not separate support tickets.
What Microsoft 365 token replay means for your business
In its campaign report, Huntress describes attackers combining several techniques to compromise business email accounts. The following response checks translate that reported combination into practical investigation steps; they are not claims that every affected account experienced every technique.
An adversary-in-the-middle, or AiTM, phishing relay sits between a user and a legitimate sign-in service. It can pass through the authentication process while capturing session material. An attacker may then reuse a stolen token to access services without repeating the victim’s normal sign-in steps.
This does not mean all MFA is ineffective. It means a completed MFA challenge is not, by itself, proof that subsequent activity belongs to the employee. Phishing-resistant authentication reduces exposure to relay attacks, but enrolment, recovery and session controls still matter.
For a business, the risk extends beyond reading email. Access may support payment redirection, customer impersonation or further account manipulation. The investigation must establish what the attacker changed and what business information they could reach.
Start with containment and a shared timeline
When Microsoft 365 token replay is suspected, assign an incident owner and bring identity, endpoint and email investigation into one workflow. Avoid having different administrators close their own tickets without comparing findings.
Take these initial steps through a trusted administrative account:
- Restrict the affected account’s access as appropriate, revoke sign-in sessions and reset compromised credentials.
- Preserve available sign-in, directory audit and mailbox audit records promptly, without delaying urgent containment.
- Record the suspected phishing time, unusual sign-ins and subsequent account changes in a consistent time zone.
- Contact the employee through a verified channel outside the potentially compromised mailbox.
- Assess whether the endpoint needs investigation, particularly if downloaded files or credential-stealing malware are also suspected.
Do not assume a password reset immediately invalidates every form of existing access. Token behaviour, application sessions and revocation enforcement vary. Verify containment through subsequent activity rather than treating one administrative action as proof of recovery.
Record gaps in evidence too. Audit availability and retention depend on configuration and licensing; missing records do not establish that nothing happened.
Check device registrations against your actual inventory
An unfamiliar Microsoft Entra device record deserves investigation, but it is not automatically malicious. Staff replacements, personal devices and legitimate enrolment processes can all create new records.
For each device associated with the affected identity, check:
- When it was registered and whether that aligns with suspicious sign-ins.
- Which identity registered or owns it.
- Whether its identifier matches an approved asset or a verified personal device.
- Its join type, management state and compliance status.
- Whether sign-in records show activity associated with that device identifier.
A device being registered in Entra is not the same as being managed or compliant. Do not infer trust from its display name, which may resemble a legitimate laptop.
Preserve relevant identifiers and audit events before disabling or removing unauthorised records. Then review who can register or join devices and what authentication is required for those actions. Device limits alone are not an adequate security boundary.
The important correlation is timing: a new registration shortly after a suspicious session should be examined alongside authentication changes and mailbox activity.
Verify authentication methods with the employee
Microsoft 365 token replay investigations should include both current authentication methods and the audit history of changes. A list of methods that looks ordinary today may conceal an unauthorised addition or replacement during the incident.
Check for newly enrolled authenticators, phone-number changes, added passkeys or security keys, and unexpected recovery or temporary access arrangements. Confirm each relevant method directly with the employee through a trusted channel.
Ask specific questions. “Did you add an authenticator on Tuesday afternoon?” is more useful than “Does your MFA look right?” An employee may have approved a prompt without understanding that it related to a security change.
Remove unauthorised methods and arrange verified re-enrolment where necessary. Investigate who performed each change, including whether an administrator or helpdesk reset contributed to the sequence.
For longer-term controls, review Microsoft 365 passkey enrolment, recovery and fallback. Strong authentication needs a recovery process that cannot be bypassed by a convincing impersonation call.
Inspect inbox rules beyond what Outlook displays
Mailbox rules can help an attacker conceal replies, security notices or messages about a fraudulent payment. Checking only the employee’s visible Outlook rules is not sufficient when concealed rules are suspected.
Have an appropriately authorised administrator inspect rules using supported Exchange administration tools, including hidden rules where the tooling supports them. Review rule conditions, actions, destinations, creation history and changes where records are available.
Look for rules that:
- Delete, move or mark relevant messages as read.
- Match finance contacts, supplier names or payment-related subjects.
- Redirect or forward messages to unfamiliar addresses.
- Hide replies to messages the employee does not recognise.
Also check mailbox-level forwarding, delegates and mailbox permissions separately. These are distinct settings and may not appear in an inbox-rule review.
Preserve suspicious rule details before removing them. Review sent, deleted and recoverable items where available, while recognising that mailbox contents alone may not provide a complete activity history.
If invoice conversations were affected, involve finance immediately. Verify changed bank details by calling a known contact using an independently held number, not contact information from the suspect email thread.
Connect the findings before restoring normal access
The value of investigating Microsoft 365 token replay across all three areas is the combined timeline. An unfamiliar device on its own may be legitimate. The same registration followed by an unrecognised authentication method and a rule hiding accounts-payable messages is a much stronger concern.
Build a simple evidence table recording the time, account, action, associated device or session details, business impact and response. Separate confirmed findings from assumptions.
Before closing the incident, confirm that:
- Unauthorised devices, authentication methods, rules and forwarding settings have been addressed.
- Session revocation and credential recovery have been followed by checks for renewed access.
- Relevant application consent and permissions have been reviewed where indicated.
- Potentially affected colleagues, suppliers and customers have been assessed.
- Monitoring is in place for repeat sign-ins and security-setting changes.
If personal information may have been accessed or disclosed, assess applicable privacy and breach-notification obligations. Account recovery and business-impact assessment are separate responsibilities.
Reduce the chance of a repeat incident
Use the findings to prioritise Microsoft 365 hardening: phishing-resistant MFA, controlled device enrolment, appropriate Conditional Access policies and monitoring for authentication-method and mailbox changes. Confirm licensing and test policy changes before broad deployment, with a controlled emergency-access process.
For Microsoft 365 token replay, the recovery question is not simply whether the password changed. It is whether unauthorised access paths were removed and the business consequences investigated.
Tech Engine can help review your cyber security and configure, secure and manage Microsoft 365. Call 1300 088 324 or email sales@techengine.au to discuss identity controls, mailbox monitoring and incident-response readiness.
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