SkyKick credential abuse: check Microsoft 365 supplier access
26 October 2026
Review Microsoft 365 supplier access after reported SkyKick credential abuse. Check permissions, preserve logs and coordinate backup or migration changes.
Huntress has reported abuse of ConnectWise (SkyKick) vendor credentials to access Microsoft 365 tenants. For Australian businesses using supplier-managed backup, migration or administration services, the immediate task is to establish whether relevant applications have access and whether that access has been misused.
Microsoft 365 supplier access needs its own investigation: checking employee passwords and sign-ins alone is not enough. The Huntress report calls for disabling affected applications and reviewing logs. Confirm the affected application identifiers and current remediation guidance before making changes; a product name alone is not a reliable match.
Inventory Microsoft 365 supplier access before drawing conclusions
Ask your Microsoft 365 administrator or managed IT provider to inventory supplier integrations in Microsoft Entra ID. Start with Enterprise applications, which includes the local service principals through which external applications can receive access to your tenant. Reviewing only App registrations can miss supplier-owned applications.
For each relevant integration, record:
- Application display name, application/client ID and tenant service principal object ID.
- Publisher details and the supplier responsible for the service.
- Business purpose, such as backup, migration or reporting.
- Granted permissions, consent records and any assigned directory roles.
- Whether access is delegated through a user or uses application permissions independently.
- Internal owner, supplier contact and the last known legitimate activity.
Include retired migration tools and services purchased through a reseller. Your business may have granted access without signing a direct contract with the application publisher.
Match identifiers against the incident report and verified supplier advice. Similar names can describe different applications, while renamed applications can retain the same identifiers. Keep a separate list of confirmed matches, uncertain entries and unrelated integrations.
Establish exposure separately from confirmed compromise
Finding an affected application in your tenant establishes a reason to investigate. It does not, on its own, prove that business information was accessed without authorisation.
Build an exposure timeline around when permission was granted, whether the application remained enabled, what it could access and what activity was recorded. Ask the supplier to confirm the incident window and affected identifiers through a known support channel rather than relying on an unsolicited email.
Review permissions in business terms. Could the application read mail, modify files, access directory information or make administrative changes? Check any resource-specific restrictions rather than assuming a permission applies equally across the whole tenant.
Separate your findings into three categories:
- Potential exposure: an affected application held relevant access.
- Suspicious activity: recorded behaviour cannot yet be explained by expected service operations.
- Confirmed unauthorised activity: evidence establishes access or changes outside approved use.
Normal-looking supplier activity is not automatically safe, and an unfamiliar IP address is not automatically malicious. Compare timestamps, resources and operations with backup schedules, migration jobs and supplier explanations.
Preserve logs while containment proceeds
Evidence collection and access containment should run in parallel. Do not leave confirmed malicious access available while waiting for a perfect export.
Have your administrator preserve the available records most relevant to Microsoft 365 supplier access:
- Entra service principal sign-in logs: application authentication, target resources, timestamps, source addresses and results where recorded.
- User sign-in logs: relevant interactive and non-interactive activity where delegated access or associated accounts are involved.
- Entra audit logs: consent grants, permission changes, service principal changes and directory role assignments.
- Microsoft 365 audit records: relevant Exchange, SharePoint and OneDrive operations, subject to the tenant’s logging coverage.
- Supplier job records: backup runs, migration batches, administrative actions and support correspondence.
Export records in their available structured formats, retaining identifiers, timestamps and time zones. Store originals in a restricted evidence location and document who collected them, when and with which filters. Screenshots can provide context but should not replace available log exports.
Retention and detail vary with configuration and licensing. An empty search does not prove there was no access, particularly when records have expired or the relevant activity was not captured. Document those gaps explicitly.
Contain access without disabling unrelated services
Treat a confirmed match to affected application identifiers as urgent. Coordinate with your security responder, Microsoft 365 administrator and supplier to apply the recommended containment. If active abuse is suspected, containment takes priority over keeping a backup or migration job running.
The aim is targeted removal of the risky access, not indiscriminate deletion of every supplier integration.
Before changing an application, capture its identifiers, permissions and configuration where practical. Record which jobs depend on it and who has authorised the change. Depending on the access model and verified guidance, containment may involve disabling the service principal, removing consent or permissions, and addressing associated accounts or partner relationships.
Do not assume that changing employee passwords stops application-only access. Likewise, disabling an application should not be treated as proof that every previously issued token has immediately stopped working. Ask the responder to verify the effect of the controls and monitor for continuing activity.
Credentials for a supplier-owned application may be controlled by the supplier, not your tenant administrator. Local containment and supplier remediation therefore need separate confirmation.
For wider controls, use our Microsoft 365 hardening checklist alongside the incident response.
Plan for backup and migration disruption
A pause in service may be necessary, but its consequences should be visible to operations and finance leaders.
For backup services, establish the last successful recovery point, which workloads stop receiving protection and whether existing backup data remains accessible. Ask whether restore operations depend on the same application being contained. Confirm this with the supplier rather than assuming backups are either lost or unaffected.
For migrations, document completed batches, remaining work, synchronisation status and any scheduled cutover. Avoid reconnecting through a replacement application until its identity, permissions and safety have been verified.
Agree on a temporary continuity plan. This may mean postponing a migration cutover, documenting a backup coverage gap or prioritising approved protection for critical information. Our guide to turning backup records into recovery evidence explains the records worth maintaining.
Resume service only after an authorised reviewer accepts the remediation evidence and the required permissions. Test a representative job, inspect its logs and verify recovery capability where relevant.
Close the investigation with accountable decisions
Keep a concise incident record covering exposure, evidence gaps, containment, service impact and recovery approval. If personal information may have been accessed, involve your privacy or legal adviser to assess applicable obligations, including the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme where relevant. Exposure alone does not establish that notification is required.
Make Microsoft 365 supplier access a recurring review item. Assign owners, remove permissions when projects finish and require approval before suppliers introduce replacement integrations. Review application access alongside user accounts, not as an occasional procurement exercise.
Tech Engine can help review your cyber security and configure, secure and manage Microsoft 365, including supplier permissions and coordinated incident containment. Call 1300 088 324 or email sales@techengine.au to discuss your tenant and service dependencies.
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